PREFACE
Robert W. Rosenthal
I was a graduate student in Stanford’s Operations Research Department in the
late 1960s. I had lost interest in the primary subjects of that discipline and
had become interested in doing my dissertation research in game theory, which
was then a fringe area of or. Resigned to working on my own, I was pleasantly
surprised to learn that there was somebody at Stanford who actually knew
something about the subject. This was Robert Wilson, and, to my delight, he
not only knew quite a lot about the subject, but he agreed to take me on as a
student.
Although Bob was then already beginning his path-breaking work applying
noncooperative game methods to an array of problems in the social sciences,
most of the rest of the (then very small) game theory world was still doing
cooperative theory. But Bob was interested in that subject too then, and so he
started (i.e., carried) me down that path. Bob encouraged me to go beyond the
conﬁnes of characteristic function theory in order to be able to deal with social
possibilities that were not well captured by the rigid conﬁnes of the characteristic
function form, such as beneﬁcial externalities in economies. The paper reprinted
in this volume was extracted from the resulting dissertation. It introduces the
awkwardly named “eﬀectiveness form,” which is somewhat more ﬂexible than
the characteristic function form and which was subsequently studied in more
depth by others with the adjective changed for some reason to the equally
awkward “eﬀectivity.” (I should have known by then how important it is to
invent the catchiest possible names for one’s constructions. Probably Bob tried
and failed to impress that lesson on me.)
While Bob and I have never collaborated in published work, we did (with
Ken Boudwin, another student of that era) co-write a couple of working papers on algorithmic issues. The lessons learned from that and the dissertation
production experience were instrumental in my development as a scholar and
teacher. I have also sought Bob’s advice from time to time in the intervening
years on academic and nonacademic matters. He has never disappointed. Although our personal contacts are now infrequent, I know I can still rely on him
for guidance, encouragement, and (best of all) friendship.
In my time at Stanford, as subsequently, Bob attracted a stimulating collection of students from a variety of Stanford departments. John Chamberlin,
John Ferejon, and Stef Bloomﬁeld are three who come to mind, but there were
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probably others then as well, and the interactions among this group of students
from diverse backgrounds led by Bob were a constant source of ideas for new
applications of game theoretic ways of thinking about social problems.
Although game theory had had little inﬂuence on economics by the time I
left Stanford in 1970, I had pretty much decided, no doubt inﬂuenced by Bob,
that I wanted to work on economic applications of game theory. Of course, in
the intervening years game theory has become not only important for economics
but the very language within which much of economics is expressed. Bob has
been responsible for a lot of this, as is widely acknowledged; and Bob got me in
on the ground ﬂoor, for which I am forever grateful.

